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"OVERRULING" OPINIONS IN THE SUPREME COURT

Albert P. Blaustein* and Andrew H. Field**

I
INTRODUCTION

its vaunted reputation for rectitude, the United
States Supreme Court has been the first to deny its own
judicial infallibility. For in at least ninety decisions, dating
as far back as 1810 and as recent as its 1956 Term, the Supreme
Court has made public confession of error by overruling its
previous determinations.
This is a study of those ninety decisions-a statistical accounting of overruling cases and cases overruled, and a listing of the
judges who agreed and disagreed with what was said and done.
And this is a study of the "right to be wrong"-an inquiry into
when and under what circumstances the Supreme Court should
overrule its prior dictates.
This is also an introduction to ninety studies which should be
made on each of these ninety overrulings. For each of these "drastic" decisions warrants individual inquiry and analysis. The Supreme Court is a courageous court. Only a courageous court
would have faced the reactions of the times to Marbury v. Madison,1 Dred Scott v. Sanford,2 Schecter Corp. v. United States,8 and
Brown v. Board of Education. 4 Yet even a courageous tribunalespecially one so adept at distinguishing and qualifying prior
judicial pronouncements-is loath to admit judicial error. Has
it really been necessary for the Supreme Court to take this drastic
step on ninety separate occasions? And if not really necessary, can
such decisions be justified?

D

ESPIT:m

• Associate Professor of Law, Rutgers Law School, South Jersey Division.-Ed.
••Rutgers, '58 Law.-Ed.
11 Cranch (5 U.S.) 137 (1803).
2 19 How. (60 U.S.) 393 (1857).
3 295 U.S. 495 (1935).
4 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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II
-NINETY-MORE OR LESS

There is no magic in the number "ninety." The broad statement that the Supreme Court has overruled itself on ninety
separate occasions is, like all broad statements, subject to qualifications. But the figure of ninety has not been lightly chosen. It
represents a total of three categories of Supreme Court overr{!lings, selected on the basis of three definite criteria.
Here are (1) cases in which the Supreme Court has expressly
stated that it was overruling a prior decision; or (2) cases which
Justice Brandeis or Justice Douglas have cited as further examples of overrulings; or (3) other cases which the authors believe to be obvious instances in which the Supreme Court has
overruled itself. Scant note has been made of those decisions
which have become legal nullities through being qualified or
distinguished.
In seventy of the ninety cases, the nine men made definite
statements that they were overruling prior determinations. Such
statements take many forms. The most clear-cut of these pronouncements appear (chronologically) in such cases as County
of Cass v. Johnston, Motion Picture Patents Company v. Universal Film Manufacturing Co., Chicago & Eastern Illinois R.
Co. v. Industrial Commission, Smith v. Allwright and Girouard
v. United States.
In the 1877 Cass County case, for example, the Supreme
Court had this to say: "It follows that our decision in Harshman
v. Bates County,5 in so far as it declares the law to be unconstitutional, must be overruled." 6 The overruling statement in the
1917 Motion Picture Patents case ran this way: "It is obvious
that the conclusions arrived at in this opinion are such that the
decision in Henry v. Dick Co.7 must be regarded as overruled." 8
The 1932 Chicago & Eastern Illinois R. Co. case contained this
statement: "Both [prior9] cases are out of harmony with the
general current of the decisions of this court . . . and they are
now definitely overruled."10 Smith v. Allwright in 1944 ended
92 U.S. 569 (1875).
95 U.S. 360 at 369 (1877).
7 224 U.S. 1 (1912).
8243 U.S. 502 at 518 (1917).
9 Erie R. Co. v. Collins, 253 U.S. 77 (1920), and Erie R. Co. v. Szary, 253 U.S. 86 (1920).
10 284 U.S. 296 at 299 (1932).
IS

6
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with the simple statement that, "Grovey v. Townsend 11 is overruled."12 And the Girouard decision in 1946 was summed up
in these words: "We conclude that the Schwimmer,13 Macintoshu
and Bland15 cases do not state the correct rule of law." 16
Other overrulings are expressed more hesitantly, even apologetically. Here, for example, is the statement in Gordon v. Ogden
in 1830: "Although that case was decided by a divided court, and
although we think [it was erroneous] . . . , we should be much
inclined to adhere to the decision in Wilson vs. Daniel17 had
not a contrary practice since prevailed."18 In Mason v. Eldred
in 1867, the 1810 case of Sheehy v. Mandeville 19 was overruled
in these words: "The decision in this [Sheehy] case has never
received the entire approbation of the profession, and its correctness has been doubted and its authority disregarded in
numerous instances by the highest tribunals of different states.''20
And in The Genesee Chief, Taney used this language: "It is
the decision in the case of Thomas J efferson21 which mainly
embarrasses the court in the present inquiry. We are sensible
of the great weight to which it is entitled. But at the same
time we are convinced that, if we follow it, we follow an erroneous decision into which the court fell ...." 22
Finally, in still other instances of express overrulings, the
Supreme Court has appeared to disclaim responsibility for its
action, intimating that the overrulings had already occurred in
previous decisions. In Olsen v. Nebraska, for example, Justice
Douglas had this to say: "The drift away from Ribnik v. McBride,23 supra, has been so great that it can no longer be deemed
a controlling authority.'' 24 Justice Bradley put it this way in
Kountze v. Omaha Hotel Co.: "Subsequent decisions have undoubtedly modified the rule followed in this case, and, indeed,
11295 U.S. 45 (1935).
12 321 U.S. 649 at 666 (1944).
13 United States v. Schwimmer, 279 U.S. 644 (1929).
14 United States v. Macintosh, 283 U.S. 605 (1931).
15 United States v. Bland, 283 U.S. 636 (1931).
16 328 U.S. 61 at 69 (1946).
17 3 Dall. (3 U.S.) 401 (1798).
18 3 Pet. (28 U.S.) 33 at 34 (1830).
19 6 Cranch (IO U.S.) 253 (1810).
20 6 Wall. (73 U.S.) 231 at 236 (1867).
21 IO Wheat. (23 U.S.) 173 (1825).
22 12 How. (53 U.S.) 443 at 456 (1851).
23 277 U.S. 350 (1928).
24 313 U.S. 236 at 244 (1941).
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have overruled it, and are more in accordance with the views
expressed by Mr. Justice Catron [dissenting in Stafford v. Union
Bank of La.25]." 26 An even stronger statement to this effect appears
in Justice Fuller's opinion in Leisy v. Hardin: "The authority
of Peirce v. New Hampshire 27 • • • must be regarded as having
been distinctly overthrown by the numerous cases hereinafter
referred to." 28 And then Justice Fuller analyzed those "numerous
cases" to prove his point.
·
Footnotes to a dissenting opinion by Justice Brandeis and
to an address and a book by Justice Douglas add ten more cases
to the list of Supreme Court decisions which have been overruled-cases in addition to the seventy expressly overruled. The
fruits of Brandeis' research in this area are found in notes I, 2
and 4 of his dissent in Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co.29 in
1932. But of the 42 cases cited in these notes, only three are
pertinent additions. Twenty-nine overrulings are listed, including 26 which are express; and Brandeis cites 13 decisions which
have been qualified rather than overruled by subsequent Supreme
Court dictates. The three "non-express" overrulings cited by
Brandeis were in Louisville, Cincinnati & Charleston R. R. Co.
v. Letson (1844),30 The Belfast (1868),31 and Pollock v. Farmers'
Loan & Trust (1895).32
Justice Douglas, who more than any other member of the present court believes that "stare decisis must give way before the
dynamic component of history," 33 prepared his lists of overrulings
for the 1949 Cardozo Lecture34 before The Association of the Bar
of the City of New York and for his 1956 volume, We the
Judges. 35 The overrulings noted in his address cover two periods
of Supreme Court history. To the extent that they discuss changes
in Supreme Court holdings from 1860 to 1890, the list is largely
repetitious of the Brandeis footnotes. But Douglas' lecture supplements the 1932 Brandeis study by covering the period 1937 to
25 16 How. (57 U.S.) 135 (1853).
26 107 U.S. 378 at 387 (1882).
27 5 How. (46 U.S.) 504 (1847).
28 135 U.S. 100 at 118 (1890).
29 285 U.S. 393 at 406-409 (1932).
so 2 How. (43 U.S.) 497 (1844).
s17 Wall. (74 U.S.) 624 (1868).
32 158 U.S. 601 (1895). Despite Brandeis' characterization, there is, of course, much
doubt as to whether the Pollock case was really an overruling decision.
83 Douglas, "Stare Decisis," 49 COL. L. R.Ev. 735 at 737 (1949).
34 Published as "Stare Decisis," 49 CoL. L. R.Ev. 735 at 756-758 (1949).
85 At pp. 32-34.
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1949, and the notes in We the Judges bring his listing up to 1955.
Yet Douglas cites only 51 cases and adds only eight instances
of overrulings which are not express-and one of these, The Belfast,36 is likewise on the Brandeis list. There are two early cases
which Brandeis did not classify in this category, but which Douglas does. These overruling cases are Trebilcock v. Wilson (1871) 37
and Wabash, St. L. & P. Ry. Co. v. Illinois (1886).38 The other five
instances characterized as overrulings by Douglas occur in the
more recent decisions of Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB (1941),39
United States v. Classic (1941), 40 Toucey v. N. Y. Life Ins. Co.
(1941), 41 Mercoid Corporation v. Mid-Continent Co. (1944) 42 and
United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Assn. (1944). 43
There are ten additional cases which the authors believe to be
obvious instances in which the Supreme Court had overruled itself by the end of its 1956 term. Two of these occurred subsequent to the Brandeis-Douglas studies: Gayle v. Browder in
195644 and the rehearing in Reid v. Covert in 1957.45 Four of the
other overrulings, like Reid v. Covert, involved rehearings46 and
the other four 47 are additions to (and represent disagreement
with) the Brandeis-Douglas lists.
While these 90 examples of Supreme Court overrulings constitute the largest list ever compiled on the subject,48 they do not
encompass every instance in which the Court has specifically
changed its collective mind. There are also 15 cases in which the

36 7 Wall. (74 U.S.) 624 (1868).
3712 Wall. (79 U.S.) 687 (1871).
38 118 U.S. 557 (1886).
39 313 U.S. 177 (1941).
40 313 U.S. 299 (1941).
41314 U.S. 118 (1941).
42 320 U.S. 661 (1944).
43 322 U.S. 533 (1944). There is a serious question whether the South-Eastern Underwriters Assn. case was really an overruling, and it is listed here only to make the Douglas
classification complete.
44 352 U.S. 903 (1956).
45 354 U.S. 1 (1957).
46 Chesapeake &: Ohio Ry. Co. v. Leitch, 276 U.S. 429 (1928); Railroad Commission v.
Pacific Gas Co., 302 U.S. 388 (1938); Halliburton Co. v. Walker, 329 U.S. 1 (1946); and
MacGregor v. Westinghouse Co., 329 U.S. 402 (1947).
47 Suydam v. Williamson, 24 How. (65 U.S.) 427 (1861); Rochester Tel. Corp. v.
United States, 307 U.S. 125 (1939); Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160 (1941); and Ott v.
Mississippi Bargeline, 336 U.S. 169 (1949).
48 Other important lists of Supreme Court overrulings, which largely duplicate the
Brandeis-Douglas studies, include: Reed, J., majority opinion in Smith v. Allwright, 321
U.S. 649, 665, note 10 (1944); PRITCHETT, THE ROOSEVELT COURT 300, 301 (1948); Bernhardt,
"Supreme Court Reversals on Constitutional Issues," 34 CoRN. L. Q. 55 at 56-59 (1948).
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Court reversed prior orders denying certiorari.49 And there are
hundreds of cases in which the Supreme Court has taken at least
a "departure" from former dictates.

III
0VERRULINGS AND "EROSION"

Most students of Supreme Court law-especially of constitutional law-are far more interested in the erosion of Supreme
Court doctrine than in overrulings. They are deeply concerned
with something called judicial discretion, judicial statesmanship
or judicial law-making-and are primarily interested in the
process by which former decisions are avoided or evaded in developing new doctrine. They are, of course, aware of the many
opinions which have ignored decisions of the past on the same
subject-even when those decisions were diligently argued by
counsel. And these students are similarly aware of the techniques
of opinion writers in disposing of past decisions by separating
what they call holdings from what they call dicta, and in distinguishing cases on supposed differences in facts. These are the
students who continually look behind expressed rationale. They
find erosion of Supreme Court doctrine as they question whether
the old and new cases could have been decided as they were by
the same nine men on the same day.
It is not always easy to separate instances of overrulings from
instances of erosion. Such classification is arbitrary at best. For, as
pointed out by Justice Douglas, "the distinguishing of precedents is often a gradual and reluctant way of overruling cases." 110
And, as Justice Brandeis observed, "Movement in constitutional
interpretation and application-often involving no less striking
departures from doctrines previously established-takes place also
without specific overruling or qualification of the earlier cases."111
49 The reversals which finally granted certiorari were Paramount Publix Corp. v.
American Tri-Ergon Corp., 293 U.S. 528 (1934); Douglas v. Willcuts, 295 U.S. 722 (1935);
New World Life Ins. Co. v. United States, 310 U.S. 654 (1940); Neuberger v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 310 U.S. 655 (1940); Esenwein v. Commonwealth ex rel.
Esenwein, 322 U.S. 725 (1944); McCullough v. Karamerer Corp., 322 U.S. 766 (1944);
Tomkins v. Missouri, 322 U.S. 725 (1944); Hickman v. Taylor, 328 U.S. 876 (1946); Gardner
v. New Jersey, 328 U.S. 876 (1946); Madison Avenue Corp. v. Asselta, 329 U.S. 817 (1946);
Interstate Natural Gas Co. v. Federal Power Commission, 330 U.S. 852 (1947); Alaska
Juneau Gold Mining Co. v. Robertson, 331 U.S. 793 (1947); United States ex rel. Eichenlaub v. Watkins, 337 U.S. 955 (1949); Clark v. Manufacturers Trust, 337 U.S. 953 (1949);
Sacher v. United States, 342 U.S. 858 (1951).
50 Douglas, "Stare Decisis,'' 49 CoL. L. REv. 735 at 747 (1949).
Ill Dissenting in Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393 at 408 (1932).
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Where Supreme Court doctrine undergoes gradual changes
over long periods of time, it is extremely difficult to pinpoint
the decision which results in the actual, practical overruling.
Tigner v. Texas' 2 must be cited as the case which overruled
Connolly v. Union Sewer Pipe Co.153 But Justice Frankfurter,
writing for the majority, clearly recognized the dwindling influence of the prior determination as a constitutional precedent.
"Connolly's case," he wrote in Tigner v. Texas, "has been worn
away by the erosion of time, and we are of opinion that it is no
longer controlling." 154
The problem of designating the actual overruling is even
more difficult in the desegregation decisions. Plessy v. Ferguson,llr,
the 1896 case which upheld racial discrimination where conditions were "separate but equal," died as a precedent long before
the current spate of Supreme Court decisions on the issue. But
when was Plessy v. Ferguson overruled? The last Supreme Court
case which in any way upheld a racial classification was Korematsu
v. United States in 1944.56 But this decision, based on wartime
powers and wartime emergencies, received no solace from the
Plessy doctrine and could in no way be considered a determination in the Plessy spirit. The last decision of the Supreme Court
consistent with the Plessy spirit-but by no means a reaffirmance
of the Plessy holding-was Gong Lum v. Rice in 1927.57 Thus,
with the possible exception of the K.orematsu determination, it
can safely be said that every Supreme Court decision since 1927
involving racial discrimination constituted some erosion of the
Plessy doctrine.
But it was virtually impossible to classify Plessy v. Ferguson
as overruled until the school desegregation decision of Brown v.
Board of Education in 1954. And even that decision was questionable on the point of overruling. Chief Justice Warren's unanimous opinion took pains to avoid an overruling statement.
Further, in the absence of later cases which clarified the meaning
of the Brown decision, it could well have been argued that "separate but equal" was still reasonable in transportation (Plessy),
even if it was not reasonable in the public schools (Brown).
310 U.S. 141 (1940).
184 U.S. 540 (1902).
54 310 U.S. 141 at 147 (1940). In a similar vein, see cases cited, notes 23 to 28 supra.
See also Louisville Railroad Co. v. Letson, 2 How. (43 U.S.) 497 at 554-555 (1844).
55 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
56 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
57 275 U.S. 78 (1927).
52
53
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The decision which must be classified as the one overruling
Plessy v. Ferguson was Gayle v. Browder in 1956.58 For Gayle,
like Plessy, involved transportation, and the facts were as similar
as one could expect in two different cases before the Supreme
Court. Yet even here there was no express overruling. The entire
Supreme Court decision was set forth in a per curiam opinion
of two brief sentences: "The motion to affirm is granted and the
judgment is affirmed. Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S.
483; Mayor and City Council of Baltimore v. Dawson, 350 U.S.
877; Holmes v. Atlanta, 350 U.S. 879."
Sometimes there is no Gayle v. Browder to assist the classifier
who seeks the case which turns erosion into an overruling. Where
is the decision, for example, which marks the end of such discredited and eroded opinions as Gitlow v. New York 59 and Whitney v. California? 60 The most clear-cut denunciation of the doctrine expressed in those cases appears in Chief Justice Vinson's
opinion in Dennis v. United States. 61 Wrote the Chief Justice:
"Although no case subsequent to Whitney and Gitlow has expressly overruled the majority opinions in those cases, there is
little doubt that subsequent opinions have inclined to the
Holmes-Brandeis [dissenting] rationale. " 62 And Vinson then cites
nine cases in support of his position. 63
It is impossible, however, to classify Dennis v. United States
as a case overruling the Whitney and Gitlow decisions. Nor is
it possible to cite numerous other instances of erosion as strong
enough to constitute overrulings. Brandeis recognized this problem in his famous footnotes on the general subject in Burnet
v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co. 64 There he lists sixteen striking examples of "qualifying" opinions-all of which are certainly close
to overrulings, but which Brandeis and the authors have hesitated to place in this category.65
58 352
59 268
60 274

U.S. 903 (1956).
U.S. 652 (1925).
U.S. 357 (1927).
61341 U.S. 494 (1951).
62 Id. at 507.
63 Ibid. Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 at 104-106 (1940); Carlson v. California,
310 U.S. 106 at 113 (1940); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 at 308, 311 (1940);
Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252 at 260-263 (1941); Taylor v. Mississippi, 319 U.S. 583
at 589-590 (1943); West Virginia Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 at 639
(1943); Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516 at 530 (1945); Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331
at 333-336 (1946); Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367 at 373 (1947).
64 285 U.S. 393 at 406-409 (1932).
65 Id. at 406-408, notes 1 and 2.
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Nor should a case like Skinner v. Oklahoma66 be classified
as having overruled Buck v. Bell. 61 True, if the concurring
opinion of Jackson had been the majority opinion rather than
that of Douglas, there would have been an express overruling.
Such, however, was not the situation. True also, if both cases
had been before the Supreme Court on the same day and had the
Skinner philosophy prevailed, Buck v. Bell would probably have
been decided differently. But this, of course, does not amount
to an overruling.
Finally, there are instances of erosion which are so recentand so subject to re-definition-that it would be presumptuous
to apply the overruling label. Yates v. United States68 in 1957
resulted in the reversal of 14 convictions for conspiracy to violate
the Smith Act. It distinguished the Dennis69 case of 1957 which
had affirmed the conviction under the Smith Act of the so-called
first-string Communist leaders. Thus the Yates case is certainly
not an example of an express overruling. And whether it can
be classified as any kind of overruling will depend upon other
Communist conspiracy cases yet to come which will explain just
what the Yates decision means.

IV
STATISTICS AND

PERSONALITIES

The first overruling decision of the Supreme Court of the
United States was handed down in 1810 in Hudson v. Guestier. 10
By a 4-1 vote, with Justice Brockholst Livingston delivering the
majority opinion and Chief Justice John Marshall the lone dissenter, the Court overruled the two-year-old decision of Chief
Justice Marshall in Rose v. Himely. 71 At issue was the right of
French warships to seize American vessels trading with the
revolutionary forces of French-owned Santo Domingo-and the
Court finally upheld this right.
But what was far more important was that a supposedly
Marshall-dominated Court, unmoved by a Marshall dissent, had

66 316 U.S. 535
67 274 U.S. 200
68 354 U.S. 298
69 341 U.S. 494
70 6 Cranch (10

(1942).
(1927).
(1957).
(1951).
U.S.) 281 (1810).
714 Cranch (8 U.S.) 241 (1808).
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overturned a Marshall decision in establishing the right of the
Supreme Court to re-evaluate and overrule its prior determinations. And there are today at least ninety precedents sustaining
this right-up to and including the twin cases of Reid v. Covert
and Kinsella v. Krueger72 in 1957.
Rose v. Himely, decided in 1808, was not the earliest Supreme
Court case to meet eventual overruling. Hylton v. United States78
in 1796 was law for 99 years-until the "overruling" (according to
Brandeis' characterization)73a in Pollock v. Farmers' Loan &Trust74 in 1895. Wilson v. Daniel,75 a 1798 case, was overruled by
Gordon v. Ogden76 in 1830; and the 1806 decision in Strawbridge
v. Curtiss77 was overruled in 1844 in Louisville, Cincinnati &Charleston R. R. Co. v. Letson.78
While Hylton v. United States survived for 99 years, it was
not the longest-lived of the Supreme Court cases overruled. The
doctrine of City of New York v. Miln,79 a 6 to 1 decision in 1837,
was not overruled until the unanimous decision in Edwards v.
California80 in 1941-104 years later. Dobbins v. Erie County 81
in 1842 was overruled 97 years later by the 1939 case of Graves v.
New York ex rel. O'Keefe.82 And Swift v. Tyson, 83 another 1842
decision, was law until Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins 84 in 1938, a
period of 96 years.
At the other extreme are eight Supreme Court decisions
which were overruled in less than a year. Seven of these cases
were reversed on rehearings-one, Thibaut v. Car &- Gen-eral
Ins. Corp.,85 within 42 days. The eighth case was the 1942
decision in Jones v. Opelika86 which was overruled eleven months
later by Murdock v. Pennsylvania87 and a per curiam opinion in
72 354 U.S. 1 (1957).
73 3 Dall. (3 U.S.) I7l (1796).
73a See note 32 supra.
74 158 U.S. 601 (1895).
75 3 Dall. (3 U.S.) 401 (1798).
76 3 Pet. (28 U.S.) 33 (1830).
77 3 Cranch (7 U.S.) 267 (1806).
782 How. (43 U.S.) 497 (1844).
79 11 Pet. (36 U.S.) 102 (1837).
so 314 U.S. 160 (1941).
81 16 Pet. (41 U.S.) 434 (1842).
82 306 U.S. 466 (1939).
83 16 Pet. (41 U.S.) 1 (1842).
84 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
85 332 U.S. 751 (1947), and 332 U.S. 828 (1947).
86 316 U.S. 584 (1942).
87 319 U.S. 105 (1943).
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a rehearing of Jones v. Opelika88 based on the reasoning of the
Murdock decision.
The average (mean) life-span of cases overruled is 24 years.
The median figure is 17 years.
Of the 90 overruling decisions, the largest percentage was
rendered by the Stone Court from 1941 to 1946. There were 21
overrulings during this five-year period, as compared with only
7 overrulings down to the end of the Civil War. More than half
(47) of the overruling opinions were handed down since 1937.
Here is a breakdown by Court:
Number
Years
Chief Justice
Overrulings
1789-1795
0
Jay
1795
0
Rutledge
Ellsworth
1796-1800
0
Marshall
1801-1835
3
Taney
1836-1864
4
Chase
1864-1873
5
Waite
1874-1888
12
Fuller
1888-1910
4
White
1910-1921
5
Taft
1921-1930
5
1930-1941
Hughes
15
Stone
1941-1946
21
Vinson
1946-1953
13
Warren
1953-1957
3
90
The 90 overruling decisions either expressly or impliedly
overruled 122 decisions. Thus there were 122 old (overruled)
cases in which dissenters might have argued for the contrary doctrine later accepted by the Court. Conversely, there were 90 new
(overruling) cases in which dissenters might have argued stare
decisis. In total, there were 212 overruling and overruled cases in
which dissents might have been written.
Actually, there were dissents in 131 cases. In five of the old
overruled cases, however, the Supreme Court handed down 4-4
per curiam affirmances, and the dissenting votes were not recorded. The other 81 opinions were unanimous. Dissents were
recorded in 54 of the 90 overruling decisions and 72 of the 122
overruled decisions-a total of 126 cases having recorded dissents.
88 319

U.S. 103 (1943).
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Fifty-nine of the 91 justices who served on the Court as of the
end of the 1957 Term dissented in the 126 cases in which dissenting votes were recorded. There were 181 dissenters in the old
(overruled) cases arguing for the views later adopted by the Court.
There were 130 dissenters in the new (overruling) cases in which
the dissenters argued for the affirmance of prior doctrine.
Here are these same figures in tabular form:

Number ofDecisions Noted
Unanimous Decisions
Decisions with Dissents
Decisions with Dissenters
Not Recorded
Decisions with
Dissenters Recorded
Dissenting Votes Recorded

(New)
(Old)
Overruling Overruled
Cases
Total
Cases
90
122
212
45
36
81
131
54
77

54
130

5

5

72
181

126
311

The "great dissenters" were Brandeis, Stone, Holmes and
Frankfurter. Brandeis dissented in 22 old (overruled) decisions
and in two new (overruling) decisions. Stone registered 20 dissents-15 in the old cases and five in the new. Holmes was a dissenter in 18 cases, 16 of them cases overruled. Frankfurter dissented in only three cases which were later overruled, but disagreed with the majority in 13 of the new (overruling) decisions.
The tabulation on judges who dissented six times or more is
as follows:
DISSENTING IN

0 ld (Overruled) New ( Overruling)
Case
Case
Judge
Brandeis
22
2
15
5
Stone
16
2
Holmes
3
13
Frankfurter
2
11
Reed
1
11
McReynolds
2
10
Roberts
6
4
Harlan (1st)
1
9
Jackson, R. H.
6
3
White

Total
24
20
18
16
13
12
12
10
10
9

1958]
Black
Miller
Hughes
Burton
Catron
Butler
Murphy
Bradley
McK.enna
VanDevanter
Cardozo
Douglas

163

THE SUPREME COURT

5
5
7

4
3
1
6
0

2

7
0

7
5
3

2
3
4
3

2
3
0
2

6
4

9
8
8
8
7
7
7
6
6
6
6
6

V
THE RIGHT To BE WRONG
Despite the fiction of judicial infallibility, judges have been
known to be wrong. It may be useful to foster the illusion that
"judges know more law than anybody else" and that "courts always decide every question correctly" 89-but such illusions have
value only if they are recognized as illusions. It is just not true
that "the law makes few, if any, mistakes." 90 "To err is human."
And, as at least one court has observed, "after all, judges are
human." 91
On seventy occasions, the Supreme Court of the United States
has expressly overruled its decisions of the past. In at least twenty
more cases, the Supreme Court has made a decision which can
only be interpreted as an overruling. And this adds up to ninety
public confessions of error. For even if the Supreme Court had
erred in handing down its overruling opinions, there still would
be ninety instances of being wrong. Thus Supreme Court error
must be recognized as fact and. analyzed as fact. And this fact
raises certain basic quesions:
1. Does the Supreme Court have the "right" to overrule
its prior decisions?
2. Assuming that this "right" exists, under what conditions should it be exercised?
89 Levitan, "Professional Trade-Secrets: What Illusions Should Lawyers Cultivate?"
43 A.B.A.J. 628 at 630 (1957).
90 Hannah v. Lovelace-Young Lumber Co., 159 Ga. 856 at 861, 127 S.E. 225 (1925).
_ 91 Stoner v. Iowa State Highway Commission, 227 Iowa 115 at 119, 287 N.W. 269 (1939).
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3. Assuming that this "right" exists, when does the exercise of this right constitute an abuse of discretion?

A. The "Right" To Overrule
There may be a lack of logic in citing precedent for the proposition that precedent may be overruled. Yet such is the logic of
law and legal analysis. The Supreme Court's ninety overruling
decisions represent 89 judicial affirmances of the 1810 case of
Hudson v. Guestier92-and a total of ninety precedents to uphold
overrulings. It is unlikely that such quantity of opinions could be
marshaled in support of any other Supreme Court doctrine.
But authority for this principle is not limited to what the
United States Supreme Court has said and done. Blackstone took
the position that a common law judge had the right to overturn
any precedent which was "flatly absurd" or unjust or plainly inconvenient.93 And, in a similar vein, Lord Coke stated that "inconvenience in the results of a rule established by precedent is
strong argument to prove that the precedent itself is contrary to
law." 94
Lord Coke's statement is of particular significance. For even
if one believes in the immutable nature of the law, there may
still be a justification for the overruling of precedents. In the
appropriate case, an overruling may be interpreted as the correction of a prior misunderstanding as to the meaning of an unchanging legal principle-just as that same overruling may be interpreted as a judge-made change of judge-made law.
There are, of course, those who decry the existence of overrulings-but even they do not deny the right to render such decisions. They are concerned with the abuse of that right. At its
July 1957 convention, the State Bar of Texas passed a resolution
deploring "the tendency of the Supreme Court to depart from
judicial precedent in interpreting the Constitution" ;95 but the
proposed solution was to require ten years' experience as a
judge or practicing attorney for nomination to the Court. 96 The

92 6 Cranch (IO U.S.) 281 (1810).
931 BLACKST. COMM. 41 70. See POUND, FUTURE OF THE COMMON LAw 120 (1937).
94 POUND, FUTURE OF THE COMMON LAW 125 (1937).
95 See 41 J. AM. JUD. Soc. 35 (1957).
96 It is, of course, highly unlikely that such a requirement would have any effect on
oven;ulings. The only member of the present Court who has taken a strong stand against
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Texas Bar was saying that the present Supreme Court shouldn't
overrule, not that they couldn't.
From the Supreme Court bench itself have come some of the
most scathing denunciations of overruling decisions. Dissenting
in the overruling case of Pollock v. Farmers' Loan b Trust Co. in
1895, Justice (later Chief Justice) White had this to say:
"The fundamental conception of a judicial body is that
of one hedged about by precedents which are binding on the
court without regard to the personality of its members. Break
down this belief in judicial continuity, and let it be felt that
on great constitutional questions this court is to depart from
the settled conclusions of its predecessors, and to determine
them all according to the mere opinion of those who temporarily fill its bench, and our Constitution will, in my judgment, be bereft of value and become a most dangerous instrument to the rights and liberties of the people." 97
Yet White joined with the majority in four of the five overruling decisions handed down during his eleven years as chief
justice.98
Similar comments appear in dissents of Justice Roberts. Here
is his observation in Smith v. Allwright: 99 "The reason for my
concern is that the instant decision, overruling that announced
about nine years ago, tends to bring adjudications of this tribunal into the same class as a restricted railroad ticket, good for
this day and train only."
And again, in Mahnich v. Southern S. S. Co. Justice Roberts
said: 100 "The evil resulting from overruling earlier considered
decisions must be evident. In the present case, the court below
naturally felt bound to follow and apply the law as clearly announced by this court. If litigants and lower federal courts are
not to do so, the law becomes not a chart to govern conduct but
a game of chance; instead of settling rights and liabilities it
unsettles them. Counsel and parties will bring and prosecute
overrulings is Justice Frankfurter-the justice with the least number of years' experience
as a judge or practicing attorney prior to his Supreme Court appointment.
157 U.S. 429 at 652 (1894).
os Garland v. Washington, 232 U.S. 642 (1914); United States v. Nice, 241 U.S. 591
(1916); Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502 (1917); Rosen
v. United States, 245 U.S. 467 (1918). The fifth overruling decision during this period-a
decision in which White dissented-was Penna. R. Co. v. Towers, 245 U.S. 6 (1917).
99 321 U.S. 649 at 669 (1944).
100 321 U.S. 96 at 112-113 (1944).
97
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actions in the teeth of the decisions that such actions are not
maintainable on the not improbable chance that the asserted
rule will be thrown overboard. Defendants will not know whether
to litigate or to settle for they will have no assurance that a declared rule will be followed. But the more deplorable consequence will inevitably be that the administration of justice
will fall into disrepute. Respect for tribunals must fall when the
bar and the public come to understand that nothing that has
been said in prior adjudication has force in a current
controversy."
But then Justice Roberts, who had joined with the majority
in a number of important overruling decisions, 101 qualified his
objections in these words: "Of course the law may grow to meet
changing conditions. I do not advocate slavish adherence to
authority where new conditions require new rules of conduct.
But this is not such a case." 102
Thus the "right" to overrule, like the existence of at least
ninety Supreme Court -0verrulings, is a fact. But when is an
overruling "needed"? And if not "needed," when is an overruling at least "justified"?

B. To Overrule or Not To Overrule-Basic Policies
There are no legal limits to the "right" to overrule. Whether
stare decisis "shall be followed or departed from is a question
entirely within the discretion of the court, which is again called
upon to consider a question once decided." 103 But what areor should be-the metes and bounds of this discretion?
"In deciding whether or not to follow a precedent, the
Court must eventually harmonize antipathetical goals. A balance
must be struck between values which are inherent in consistency
of decision and values which flow from judicial recognition of
the changing nature and patterns of society. This is judicial labor
at its highest level." 104 And it is judicial labor in which, as Roscoe Pound points out, "we must seek principles of change no less
than principles of stability."105
101 E.g., West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937); Erie ,R. Co. v. Tompkms,
304 U.S. 64 (1938); United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941); United States v. Classic.
313 U.S. 299 (1941).
102 321 U.S. 96 at 113 (1944).
10s Hertz v. Woodman, 218 U.S. 205 at 212 (1910).
104 BLAUSTEIN AND FERGUSON, DESEGREGATION AND THE LAW 79 (1957).
1011 POUND, INTERPRETATIONS OF LEGAL HISTORY l (1923).
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The metes and bounds of judicial discretion will vary depending upon whether a constitutional issue is involved. For
there has been less adherence to precedent in the constitutional
cases. Explained Stone and Cardozo, concurring in a 1936 decision: "The doctrine of stare decisis, however appropriate and
even necessary at times, has only a limited application in the
field of constitutional law." 106
This is as it should be. The most important lesson from
the pen of Chief Justice Marshall is that "we must never forget
that it is a constitution we are expounding." 107 Justice Douglas
has amplified this assertion in these words: "The place of stare
decisis in constitutional law is even more tenuous. A judge looking at a constitutional decision may have compulsions to revere
past history and accept what was once written. But he remembers
above all else that it is the Constitution which he swore to support and defend, not the gloss which his predecessors may have
put on it. . . . He cannot do otherwise unless he lets men long
dead and unaware of the problems of the age in which he lives
do his thinking for him."108
Brandeis gives the second basic reason for the "limited application" of precedent in constitutional law. "Stare decisis,"
he said, "is usually the wise policy, because in most matters it
is more important that the applicable rule of law be settled
than that it be settled right. . . . This is commonly true even
where the error is a matter of serious concern, provided correction can be had by legislation. But in cases involving the Federal
Constitution, where correction through legislative action is practically impossible, this Court has often overruled its earlier decisions. . . . In cases involving the Federal Constitution, the
position of this Court is unlike that of the highest court of
England, where the policy of stare decisis was formulated and
is strictly applied to all classes of cases. Parliament is free to correct any judicial error; and the remedy may be promptly
invoked. " 109
Sixty of the Supreme Court's ninety overrulings have been
in the constitutional law area.

106 St. Joseph Stock Yards Co. v. United States, 298 U.S. 38 at 94 (1936).
101 McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. (17 U.S.) 316 at 407 (1819).
108 Douglas, "Stare Decisis," 49 CoL. L. REv. 735 at 736 (1949).
109 Burnet v. Coronado Oil 8e Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393 at 406-410 (1932). Emphasis

added.
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VI
"NECESSARY,"

"JUSTIFIED" AND "UNWARRANTED" OVERRULING$

Supreme Court overrulings can be conveniently divided into
three categories: (I) those which are necessary; (2) those which
are not necessary but which may be justified; and (3) those which
are unwarranted. Such division is arbitrary at best. The various
arguments under each category tend to merge with others in
other categories-for many of the arguments are based on differences in degree rather than differences in kind. But the classification does clarify analysis.

A.

"Necessary" Overrulings

There are some cases in which even the most stalwart adherent of stare decisis would agree that overrulings were "necessary." Again classification becomes arbitrary. But it can be
argued that a precedent should be overruled!. Where the Supreme Court must choose between conflicting precedents;
2. Where the Supreme Court must follow a state court's
interpretation of a state constitution or statute-and that
interpretation is contrary to the Supreme Court's prior
decision;
3. Where the Supreme Court's prior interpretation is
impracticable, resulting in great hardship or inconvenience;
4. Where there has been obvious error in the prior Supreme Court decision; and
5. Where an express overruling is merely declaratory
of a prior virtual overruling.

All of these arguments, especially the last, require explanation. The first-in which the Supreme Court must choose between conflicting precedents-is the most apparent. And the overruling in Mahnich v. Southern S. S. Co.110 is an excellent example of a case in point. Chief Justice Stone posed and settled
the conflicting precedents issue in the concluding words of the
Court's opinion: "We cannot follow [The Pinar Del Rio111] • • •
and also follow The Osceola,112 • • • the cases which it approved
110 321 U.S. 96 (1944).
111277 U.S. 151 (1928).
112 189 U.S. 158 (1903).
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and Carlisle Packing Go. v. Sandanger. 118 • • We prefer to follow the latter as the more consonant with principle and authority."114 Thus the 1928 case of The Pinar Del Rio was
overruled. Adherence to that precedent, on the other hand,
would have necessitated the overruling of the Osceola and Carlisle:' cases.
As far as the second argument is concerned, there are, of
course, many instances in which the United States Supreme
Court has been called upon to interpret a state constitution or
statute. And there are likewise instances in which the same
issues later came before state supreme courts-and where the state
supreme courts rendered decisions contrary to those of the United
States Supreme Court. In four cases115 (two involving state constitutions and two involving state statutes) the issue returned once
again to the Supreme Court of the United States. And in these
four cases the high tribunal overruled its prior decisions to comply with the state determinations. According to the United States
Supreme Court, it was necessary to do so.
Here is language from two of these cases on this necessity
for overrulings. In Fairfield v. County of Gallatin in 1879, the
Court had this to say: "And it has been held that this court will
abandon its former decision construing a State statute if the State
courts have subsequently given to it a different construction."116
Likewise, in County of Gass v. Johnston in 1877, the Court

11S 259

U.S. 255 (1922).
U.S. 96 at 105 (1944).
115 Greene v. Neal's Lessee, 6 Pet. (31 U.S.) 291 (1832), overruling Patton's Lessee v.
Easton, I Wheat. (14 U.S.) 476 (1816) (state statute); Suydam v. Williamson, 24 How.
(65 U.S.) 427 (1861), overruling Williamson v. Berry, 8 How. (49 U.S.) 495 (1850) (state
statute); County of Cass v. Johnston, 95 U.S. 360 (1877), overruling Harshman v. Bates
County, 92 U.S. 569 (1875) (state constitution); and Fairfield v. County of Gallatin, 100
U.S. 47 (1879), overruling Town of Concord v. Savings Bank, 92 U.S. 625 (1875) (state
constitution).
116 100 U.S. 47 at 54 (1879). Outlining the legal background of Supreme Court adherence to state interpretations of state law, the Court also said (at p. 52): "At a very
early day it was announced that in cases depending upon the Constitution or statutes
of a State this court would adopt the construction of the statutes or Constitution given
by the courts of the State, when that construction could be ascertained. Polk's Lessee v.
Wendell, 9 Cranch (13 U.S.] 87 [1815]. In Nesmith v. Sheldon, 7 How. [48 U.S.] 812
[1849], it is declared to be the 'established doctrine that this court will adopt and follow
the decisions of the State courts in the construction of their own Constitution and statutes,
when that construction has been settled by the decisions of its highest tribunal.' In Walker
v. State Harbor Commissioners, 17 Wall. [84 U.S.] 648 [1874], we said, 'This court follows
the adjudications of the highest court of the State' in the construction of its statutes.
'Its interpretation is accepted as the true interpretation, whatever may be our opinion
of its original soundness.' "

114 321

170

MICHIGAN

LAw R.Evrnw

[Vol. 57

expressed its holding in these words: " . . . as a rule of State
statutory and constitutional construction, [the Missouri Supreme
Court's decision] is binding upon us. It follows that our decision in Harshman v. Bates County, in so far as it declares the
law to be unconstitutional, must be overruled." 117
It can also be argued that an overruling is "necessary" where
a prior interpretation is impracticable, resulting in great hardship or inconvenience. But whether an overruling based on this
argument is in fact necessary (or merely "justified" or- even
"unwarranted") depends upon the extent of that hardship or
inconvenience.
Two famous overrulings illustrate this argument. Hepburn
v. Griswold118 resulted in hardship and would have resulted in
still more hardship. Swift v. Tyson, 119 which originally "did
no great harm when confined to what Story dealt with,"120
gradually caused inconvenience and eventually also resulted
in hardship.
It was by a 5-4 decision that the Court, in the 1872 Legal
Tender Cases,121 overruled the 5-3 decision in Hepburn v. Griswold, decided three years earlier. And there certainly would
not have been an overruling at that time had there not been
two convenient vacancies on the Supreme Court which were
immediately filled by proponents of the Legal Tender Acts. But
the political implications of those appointments had nothing to
do with the fact of hardship and potential hardship. Here is
what Justice Strong wrote for the majority in the Legal Tender
Cases:
"The debts which have been contracted since February 25,
1862, constitute, doubtless, by far the greatest portion of the
existing indebtedness of the country. They have been contracted in view of the acts of Congress declaring treasury
notes a legal tender. . . . If now, by our decision, it be established that these debts and obligations can be discharged
only by gold coin . . . ruinous sacrifices, general distress, and
bankruptcy may be expected. These consequences are too
obvious to admit of question. . . . [S]erious as they are

117 95 U.S. 360 at 369 (1877).
11s 8 Wall. (75 U.S.) 603 (1869).
119 16 Pet. (41 U.S.) I (1842).
120 2 HOWE, HOLMES-POLLOCK LE'ITERs 215 (1941).
12112 Wall. (79 U.S.) 457 (1872).
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[however, they] must be accepted, if there is a clear incompatibility between the Constitution and the legal tender acts.
But we are unwilling to precipitate them upon the country
unless such an incompatibility plainly appears." 122
The 1842 decision of Swift v. Tyson was long in bringing
hardship. But by the time of the overruling opinion of Erie R.
Co. v. Tompkins123 in 1938, it has imposed an intolerable burden upon litigants, lawyers and the courts. Justice Brandeis emphasized this argument at various points in his unanimous
opm1on:
"Experience in applying the doctrine of Swift v. Tyson,
had revealed its defects, political and social; ... the mischievous results of the doctrine had become apparent. . . . Swift
v. Tyson introduced grave discrimination by noncitizens
against citizens . . . the doctrine rendered impossible equal
protection of the law. . . . The injustice and confusion incident to the doctrine of Swift v. Tyson have been repeatedly urged. . . ." 124
The fourth argument is that an overruling is "necessary"
where there has been obvious error in a prior Supreme Court
decision. There should be no disagreement on this point; but it
would be hard to find unanimity on what is obvious. The nowcondemned separate-but-equal case of Plessy v. Ferguson 125 is
certainly not an apt illustration.
Yet it is not difficult to find examples of what might be considered obvious error. Thirty-seven of the ninety overruling decisions were unanimous-with the justices at least indicating the
"obviousness" of prior error by sheer weight of numbers. And
two of these cases contain statements which should leave no doubt
as to the mistakes of the past.
The will of Jacob Dawson, for example, was twice before
the Supreme Court. And both times, with a thirteen-year interval, the Court rendered 9-0 decisions. The overruling opinion
contained these words: "And this court, on reconsideration of
the whole matter, with the aid of the various judicial opinions
upon the subject, and of the learned briefs of counsel, is of
opinion that the sound construction of this will, . . . is in ac122 Id. at 529-531.
123 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
124 Id. at 74-77.
125 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
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cordance with the conclusion of the state court, and not with
the former decision of this court, which must, therefore, be considered as overruled. " 126
An even stronger assertion of prior error appears in a 9-0
opinion by Justice Miller which overruled another 9-0 opinion
by Justice Miller, written only two years before. Said the justice:
"we are now of the opinion, on a fuller argument and more
mature consideration, that the [former] position is not tenable." 127
There are also cases in which the Supreme Court was so
unlawyer-like or so unmindful of the consequences of its conclusions that the decisions must likewise be regarded as erroneous. The Thomas Jefferson 128 and Supreme Tribe of Ben Hur
v. Cauble129 are examples of such cases.
The Thomas Jefferson was decided in 1825 and was overruled in 1851 by The Genesee Chief. 130 At issue was the admiralty jurisdiction of the federal government. The earlier decision had limited such jurisdiction "to the ebb and flow of the
tide"; the latter decision held that this jurisdiction extended to
all navigable waters. Wrote Chief Justice Taney:
"[W]e are convinced that, if we follow ... [The Thomas
Jefferson], we follow an erroneous decision into which the
court fell, when the great importance of the question as it
now presents itself could not be foreseen; and the subject
did not therefore receive that deliberate consideration which
at this time would have been given to it by the eminent men
who presided here when that case was decided. For the
decision was made in 1825, when the commerce on the rivers
of the west and on the lakes was in its infancy, and of little
importance, and but little regarded compared with that of
the present day." 131
Justice Frankfurter wrote the majority opinion in Toucey v.
N. Y. Life ·1ns. Co.,132 which not only overruled one aspect of
Supreme Tribe of Ben Hur v. Cauble 133 but also criticized it
126 Roberts v. Lewis, 153 U.S. 367 at 377 (1894), overruling Giles v. Little, 104 U.S. 291
(1881).
127 Railway C_o. v. McShane, 22 Wall. (89 U.S.) 444 at 461 (1874), overruling Railway
Co. v. Prescott, 16Wall. (83 U.S.) 603 (1872).
12810 Wheat. (23 U.S.) 173 (1825).
120 255 U.S. 356 (1921).
130 12 How. (53 U.S.) 443 (1851).
131 Id. at 456. See also note 22 supra.
132 314 U.S. 118 (1941).
133 255 U.S. 356 (1921).
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as "sporadic" and "ill-considered." Said Frankfurter: "The Court
disposed of the ... question in one sentence, citing only one case
in support of its conclusion, . . . which, as we have seen, was
not a relitigation case [and therefore not in point].''134
Fifth and finally, some overrulings are "necessary" to point
out the fact that prior decisions have already been overruled, but
that the Court has thus far neglected to say so. These are the
cases in which the Court asserts that its overrulings are merely
declaratory of an existing state of the law.
So in the overruling case of Leisy v. Hardin, the Court took
the position that, "The authority of Peirce v. New Hampshire1311
. . . must be regarded as having been distinctly overthrown by
the numerous cases hereinafter referred to.'' 136 Similarly, in Brenham v. German American Bank, the Court said: "We, therefore,
must regard the cases of Rogers v. Burlington131 and Mitchell v.
Burlington,138 as overruled ... by later cases in this court."139
The best illustration of the "necessity" for declaratory overrulings is found in the wages and hours litigation which came
before the Supreme Court. At issue was the validity of statutes
setting minimum wages and maximum hours. Here is what
happened in these cases:

Cases
Holden v. Hardy
Lochner v. New York
Bunting v. Oregon
Adkins v. Children's
Hospital
West Coast Hotel
Co. v. Parrish

Date
1898
1905
1917

Upheld or
Denied
Validity Vote Citation
Upheld 7-2 169 U.S. 366
Denied
5-4 198 U.S. 45
Upheld
5-3 243 U.S. 426

1923

Denied

5-3 261 U.S. 525

1937

Upheld

5-4 300 U.S. 379140

134 Id. at ll!8-139.
135 5 How. (46 U.S.) 504 (1847).
136 135 U.S. 100 at ll8 (1890). See also notes 23 to 28 supra.
137 3 Wall. (70 U.S.) 654 (1866).
138 4 Wall. (71 U.S.) 270 (1867).
139144 U.S. 173 at 187 (1892).
140 This is by no means a complete list of the wage and hour

cases. Important decisions which upheld statutes setting maximum working hours for women included Muller
v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908); Riley v. Massachusetts, 232 U.S. 671 (1914); Miller v.
Wilson, 236 U.S. 373 (1915); Bosley v. McLaughlin, 236 U.S. 385 (1915); and Radice v.
New York, 264 U.S. 292 (1924). An important case reaffirming the 1923 decision in Adkins
v. Children's Hospital was Morehead v. New York, 298 U.S. 587 (1936).
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Thus, in a sense, West Coast Hotel overruled Adkins, which
had overruled Bunting, which had overruled Lochner, which had
overruled Holden. Yet Lochner sought to "distinguish" Holden,
Bunting ignored Lochner, and Adkins discussed Bunting only
as a historical event. It was not until the decision in West Coast
Hotel that the Court clarified its position, finally overruling
Adkins and, by implication, Lochner.
The various opinions in Adkins reflect the confusion which
results when the Supreme Court changes its views without announcing a definite stand on prior decided cases.
Speaking for the majority, Justice Sutherland wrote that
Lochner had declared Holden to be "inapplicable"141 and that
Lochner was still good law. "Subsequent cases [to Lochner],"
he said, "have been distinguished from that decision, but the
principles therein stated have never been disapproved." 142
The dissenters took a different view. Chief Justice Taft had
this to say: "It is impossible for me to reconcile the Bunting Case
and the Lochner Case and I have always supposed that the Lochner Case was thus overruled sub silentio." 143 Holmes was even
more definite on this point. "But after Bunting," he wrote, "I
had supposed ... that Lochner v. New York would be allowed
a deserved repose." 1«
True, the reluctance to overrule doctrine which can be
avoided has its advantages in terms of judicial flexibility. But
despite such advantages, there are instances when clarity is
still more important and where it is "necessary" for the Court
to express a definite stand by means of an overruling.
B.

"Justified" Overrulings

By a change in degree, a "necessary" overruling becomes
merely "justified."
1. Just as an overruling is "necessary" in resolving prior conflicting precedents, so an overruling is at least "justified" where
the Court must choose between following a precedent and following a contrary philosophy expressed in other cases. The Court

141261
142 Id.
H3 Id.
144 Id.

U.S. 525 at 548 (1923).
at 550.
at 564.
at 570.
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in the school segregation case of Brown v. Board of Education 145
and the transportation case of Gayle v. Browder146 finally overruled Plessy v. Ferguson. 141 And the Court was severely criticized
for its departure from this acknowledged precedent. But what
the critics failed to realize was that adherence to the 1896 case
of Plessy v. Ferguson would have resulted in a decision contrary
to the philosophy and spirit of at least four cases involving Negro
rights in education, decided between 1938 and 1950.148 Faced
with the task of determining the constitutionality of laws based
on racial segregation, the Supreme Court could not have reconciled all of the prior cases on the subject. Some decision or decisions had to be overruled-at least in spirit.
2. Just as an overruling is "necessary" where a prior decision has resulted in great hardship or inconvenience, so an overruling is at least "justified" where a prior decision fails to meet
the needs of subsequent times. This is particularly applicable
in the field of constitutional law. "While the language of the
Constitution does not change, the changing circumstances of a
progressive society for which it was designed yield new and
fuller import to its meaning." 149 It was this philosophy which led
the New Deal and Fair Deal Courts to re-examine the economic
realities of the complex society which they served and to overrule
decisions which had not stood the test of time. In 1944, for example, the Court re-examined the activities of insurance companies-companies which insured property in many jurisdictions
and issued coverage for articles moving from state to state. And
in the 1944 case of United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters
Assn.,150 the Court, at least according to Justice Douglas,150a overruled the 1869 decision in Paul v. Virginia151 which had declared that insurance was not interstate commerce.
3. Just as it is "necessary" for the Supreme Court to correct
the obvious errors of the past, so the Court is "justified" in changing its views after re-examination and reconsideration of prior
145 347 U.S.
146 352 U.S.
147 163 U.S.
148 Missouri

483 (1954).
903 (1956).
537 (1896).
ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337 (1938); Sipuel v. Board of Regents,
332 U.S. 631 (1948); Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950); McLaurin v. Oklahoma State
Regents, 339 U.S. 637 (1950).
149 Sweezy v. State of New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234 at 266 (1957).
150 322 U.S. 533 (1944).
150a See note 43 supra.
151 8 Wall. (75 U.S.) 168 (1869).
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doctrine. It is, of course, "revolting to have no better reason for
a rule of law than that it was laid down in the time of Henry
IV." 152 And "it is more important that the court should be
right upon later and more elaborate consideration of the cases
than consistent with previous declarations." 153 As Justice Reed
declared in the overruling case of Smith v. Allwright, "when convinced of former error, this Court has never felt constrained to
follow precedent."154 Another example of an overruling based
on this argument is United States v. Nice. 155 There the unanimous Court had this to say: "We recognize that a different construction was placed upon §6 of the act of 1887 in Matter of
Heff,1 56 but after re-examining the question in light of other provisions of the act and of many later enactments clearly reflecting
what was intended by Congress, we are constrained to hold that
the decision in that case is not well grounded, and it is accordingly
overruled.''157
4. Every overruling is reflective of a judicial change of mind.
Every overruling means that at least a majority of the Court believes that a former majority erred in rendering a prior decision.
When the collective majority in a new decision changes the
collective mind of the majority in a former decision, it may be
argued that the overruling was "unwarranted." But when the
same judges change their minds, the overruling is at least "justified." An 8-1 decision in West Virginia Board of Education v.
Barnette158 in 1943 overruled the 8-1 decision in Minersville
School District v. Gobitis159 in 1940. There were only two
changes in Court personnel during this period. The Court took
a different position in the latter case because three of the judgesBlack, Douglas and Murphy-changed their minds. Commenting
on these decisions, one observer presents the justification argument in these words: "This may be done without embarrassment
when the error is confessed by those who joined in the former
opinion, as in the recent Jehovah's Witness flag salute case."160
1112 Holmes,

"The Path of the Law," 10 HARv. L. R.Ev. 457 at 469 (1897).
Barden v. Northern Pacific R. Co., 154 U.S. 288 at 322 (1894).
llS4 321 U.S. 649 at 665 (1944).
llSlS 241 U.S. 591 (1916).
llSG 197 U.S. 488 (1905).
1117241 U.S. 591 at 601 (1916).
158 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
llS9 310 U.S. 586 (1940).
160 Wilson, "Stare Decisis, Quo Vadis? The Orphaned Doctrine in the Supreme Court,"
!! GEO. L. J. 251 at 253 (1945).
llS3
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Under this theory, virtually all of the Supreme Court's reversals
on rehearings are likewise "justified."161

C. "Unwarranted" Overrulings
There is no question of the Supreme Court's "right" to overrule. And there is no question but that the exercise of that "right"
is purely discretionary. Thus it follows that an "unwarranted"
overruling would be an abuse of judicial discretion. But how
realistic is a charge of "abuse" when the judicial discretion of
the Supreme Court knows no limits? For, as Justice Stone pointed
out, "the only check upon our own exercise of power is our own
sense of self-restraint."162
In a strictly legalistic sense, no overrulings are "unwarranted."
Yet this does not mean that some precedents should not be overruled. And this does not mean that lawyers should not argue that
an overruling under such-and-such circumstances may be "un•
warranted." In any event, it can at least be argued that an overruling is inappropriate!. Where the Supreme Court fails to give due consideration to the reasoning and analysis which led to the now overruled decision;
2. Where the Supreme Court fails to give due weight
to the "values which are inherent in consistency of decision"-meaning specifically the uniformity, stability and security of law upon which there can be reliance; and
3. Where the overruling results solely from changes in
Court personnel-the new members having been appointed
because of their known or promised opposition to prior
decisions.

Just as it is "necessary" for the Supreme Court to correct the
obvious errors of the past, and just as the Supreme Court is "justified" in changing its views after re-examination and reconsideration of prior doctrine, so an overruling may be "unwarranted"
where there has not been adequate evaluation of the reasoning
and analysis which led to the now overruled decision.
Antiquity is no guaranty of rectitude. No Court should be
enslaved by the avowed wisdom of the past or overawed by the
stature of its predecessors. But this view can be carried to an
161 See notes 45, 46 and 49 supra.
162 Dissenting in United States v.

Butler, 297 U.S. I at 79 (1936).
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undesirable extreme. It is also important that the Court remembers that there were able lawyers who sat on prior Courts, and
that their judgments should be given due consideration. Certainly
an overruling is "unwarranted" where the wisdom of able
judges is ignored. Certainly an overruling is "unwarranted" if
it disregards the possible unanimity which created prior doctrine
or disregards the fact that the doctrine was frequently reaffirmed.
Certainly an overruling is "unwarranted" when a hastily-made
determination is substituted for a decision made after extensive
deliberation.
The 5-3 decision in Hornbuckle v. Toombs 163 in 1873 overruled three unanimous decisions: an 8-0 determination in Noonan
v. Lee164 in 1862, a 10-0 determination in Orchard v. Hughes165
in 1863, and a 9-0 determination in Dunphy v. Kleinsmith 166 in
1870. This, of course, does not necessarily make the Hornbuckle
overruling "unwarranted," but it does serve as an example of an
overruling which the Court should have taken pains to justify.
And all that the Court said was that, "On a careful review of the
whole subject, we are not satisfied that those [overruled] decisions
are founded on a correct view of the law.'' 167
The Legal Tender Cases168 were undoubtedly correctly
decided. This, however, is a conclusion based on hindsight. Contemporary lawyers might well have questioned the extent of
judicial deliberation which led to this overruling decision. As
Chief Justice Chase pointed out in his dissent, "A majority of
the court, five to four, in the opinion which has just been read,
reverses the judgment rendered by the former majority of five
to three, in pursuance of an opinion formed after repeated arguments, at successive terms, and careful consideration. . . .''169
Frankfurter and Burton sum up this argument in their dissents in Commissioner v. Church. 170 This was a 5-3 decision in
1949, overruling the 9-0 decision of May v. Heiner171 in 1930.
Wrote Frankfurter: "If such a series of decisions, viewed in all
their circumstances, as that which established the rule in May v.
163 18 Wall. (85 U.S.) 648 (1873).
164 2 Black (67 U.S.) 499 (1862).
165 1 Wall. (68 U.S.) 73 (1863).
166 11 Wall. (78 U.S.) 610 (1870).
167 18 Wall. (85 U.S.) 648 at 653 (1873).
168 12 Wall. (79 U.S.) 457 (1872).
169 Id. at 572.
170 335 U.S. 632

(1949).
171281 U.S. 238 (1930).
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Heiner, is to have only contemporaneous value, the wisest decisions of the present Court are assured no greater permanence."172
Burton amplified this statement: " ... this Court will exercise
extreme self-restraint in using its power of self-reversal. . . . I
find nothing sufficient to justify the reversal of this Court's original construction 18 years after this Court approved it unanimously and 17 years after this Court unanimously reaffirmed
that approval." 173
The basic opposition to overrulings is couched in terms of reliance. For reliance is the key factor in any consideration of the
"values which are inherent in consistency of decision. " 174 And
even the most outspoken adherents of the right to overrule concede the necessity of making judicial determinations upon which
courts, lawyers and the public may rely. "Stare decisis," wrote
Brandeis, "is usually the wise policy, because in most matters it
is more important that the applicable rule of law be settled than
that it be settled right."175 "Stare decisis," wrote Douglas, "provides some moorings so that men may trade and arrange their
affairs with confidence."176
The importance of reliance has even led the Supreme Court
to render what it considered to be "wrong" decisions rather than
to hand down overrulings which might cause confusion or "unfortunate practical results." Helvering v. Griffiths111 and Davis
v. Department of Labor118 are examples of such determinations.
The 5 to 3 majority in H elvering v. Griffiths refused to reconsider the discredited decision in Eisner v. Macomber. 171
Wrote Jackson for the majority: "To rip out of the past seven
years of tax administration a principle of law on which both
Government and taxpayers have acted would produce readjustments and litigation so extensive we would contemplate them
with anxiety . . . a long period of accommodations to an older
decision sometimes requires us to adhere to an unsatisfactory rule
to avoid unfortunate practical results from a change."180
Another discredited decision, Southern Pacific Co. v. Jen112 335 U.S. 632 at 675 (1949).
173 Id. at 699.
174 Note 104 supra.
175 Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393 at 406 (1932).
176 Douglas, "Stare Decisis," 49 CoL. L. R.Ev. 735 at 736 (1949).
177 318 U.S. 371 (1943).
11s 317 U.S. 249 (1942).
179 252 U.S. 189 (1920).
1so 318 U.S. 371 at 403 (1943).
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sen,181 was before the Court in Davis v. Department of Labor.
Black, writing for the majority, avoided the Jensen result by
limiting that precedent to the facts. Chief Justice Stone, the sole
dissenter, agreed with the majority conclusion, but stated that
he could not join in the opinion unless the Jensen case were overruled. And here is what Frankfurter wrote in his concurring
opm1on:
"Any legislative scheme that compensates workmen or their
families for industrial mishaps should be capable of· simple and
dependable enforcement. That was the aim of Congress when
... it afforded to harbor-workers the benefits of state workmen's
compensation laws . . . . But Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen ...
frustrated this purpose. Such a desirable end cannot now be
achieved merely by judicial repudiation of the Jensen doctrine.
Too much has happened in the twenty-five years since that illstarred decision.... Therefore, until Congress sees fit to attempt
another comprehensive solution of the problem, this Court can
do no more than bring some order out of the remaining judicial
chaos as marginal situations come before us." 182
. Overrulings may be even more "unwarranted" when reliance
is in conflict with what might be termed "fashions in scholarship." There is much merit in Justice Black's contention that the
Fourteenth Amendment, ratified in 1868, was not designed to
protect corporations. And this is what he argued in his dissent
in the 1938 case of Conn·ecticut General Co. v. Johnson. 183 But
the majority refused to overrule the long line of judicial pronouncements, dating back to the 1886 decision in Santa Clara
C.o. v. Southern Pacific Railroad,184 which had declared corporations to be "persons" under the amendment. Assuming that
Black is correct on the basis of now recognized legal scholarship,
and supposing that he could convince a majority of the Court
to overrule all of the decisions holding corporations to be "persons," what judicial action would be proper if as yet undiscovered
evidence were unearthed indicating that the Fourteenth Amendment was intended to include corporations after all? What would
happen if the Co~rt were to reinterpret present doctrine on the
basis of the highly-commended and yet hotly disputed legal
181244
182 317
183 303
184 118

U.S.
U.S.
U.S.
U.S.

205 (1917).
249 at 258, 259 (1942).
77 at 83-90 (1938).
394 (1886).
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scholarship of William W. Crosskey in his Politics and the Constitution?185 Surely the desire for the consistency, uniformity, stability and security of the law upon which there can be reliance
would make overrulings "unwarranted" under these circumstances.
There may be a middle-of-the-road position which would resolve the change-consistency conflict. It was the view of Cardozo
and some other legal scholars that courts should satisfy the need
for legal change by rendering prospective overrulings-giving
judgment in a particular case in conformity with an old rule,
but announcing that a different rule would be followed in subsequent cases.186 Justice Roberts indicated his approval of this
idea in his dissent in Mahnich v. Southern S. S. Co.187 He took
the position that certain overrulings would "leave the courts
below on an uncharted sea of doubt and difficulty ... unless indeed a modern instance grows into a custom of members of this
court to make public announcement of a change in views and to
indicate that they will change their votes on the same question
when another case comes before the court. " 188 The "modern
instance" to which Roberts referred was the 1932 case of Great
Northern Ry. Co. v. Sunburst Co.189 which upheld the right of
the Supreme Court of Montana190 to make such a prospective
overruling.
The third and final argument is that overrulings are "unwarranted" when they result solely from changes in Court personnel-the new members having been appointed because of their
known or promised adherence or opposition to prior decisions.
This is something quite different from an individual change-of-

185

CROSSKEY, POLITICS

AND THE

CONSTITUTION

IN THE

HISTORY OF

THE

UNITED STATES

(1953).
186 Cardozo, Address before the New York State Bar Association, Jan. 22, 1932. In
1932 N. Y. STATE B. AssN. REP. 263,293,294.
187 321 U.S. 96 (1944).
188 Id. at 113.
189 287 U.S. 358 (1932).
190 The Supreme Court decision in Great Northern Ry. Co. v. Sunburst Co. affirmed
the decision in Sunburst Co. v. Great Northern Ry. Co., 91 Mont. 216, 7 P. (2d) 927 (1932),
which had followed the prospective overruling announced and discussed in the companion
case of Montana Horse Products Co. v. Great Northern Ry. Co., 91 Mont. 194, 7 P. (2d)
919 (1932). Many comments have been written on this subject including: Freeman, "The
Protection Afforded Against the Retroactive Operation of an Overruling Decision," 18
CoL. L. R.Ev. 230 (1918); Notes, 60 HARv. L. R.Ev. 437 (1947), 25 VA. L. R.Ev. 210 (1938);
Snyder, "Retrospective Operation of Overruling Decisions," 35 ILL. L. R.Ev. 121 (1940);
von Moschzisker, "Stare Decisis in Courts of Last Resort." 37 HARV. L. R.Ev. 409 (1924).
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mind. And this is something quite different from a general
change in the Court's position due to the appointment of justices
whose general views of the law differ from those of their
predecessors.
The argument is a good one-but only in theory. Justice
Jackson can be quoted for the proposition that "constitutional
precedents are accepted only at their current valuation and have
a mortality rate almost as high as their authors." 191 But this is
not necessarily wrong. The evil exists only where appointments
are based on an expected or pledged judicial vote on a certain
issue. And this is difficult, if not impossible, to establish.
Some Southern spokesmen have asserted that Chief Justice
Warren's appointment was predicated on his promise to desegregate the schools.192 And there was much criticism when the appointment of Justice Rutledg~ to replace the retiring Justice
Byrnes resulted in a 5-4 overruling in Jones v. Opelika193 of the
5-4 decision in that same case194 only eleven months before. And
some New Deal legislation met a more favorable judicial reception after President Roosevelt was able to replace a number of
the "nine old men" with his appointees. Yet in none of these
instances was there any real evidence of an appointment based
on a promise to decide any particular case in any particular way.
True, most chief executives tend to appoint justices who share
their general political and social views. But this is certainly not
a guaranty of future judicial expression. President R9osevelt
never could have predicted so conservative a Frankfurter; President Eisenhower must be surprised at so liberal a Warren. And
President Truman was actually outraged when two of his four
appointees-Burton and Clark-voted against the Government
in the Steel Seizure Case. 195
Perhaps the best illustration of judicial appointments designed to achieve a particular result on a particular issue occurred
in connection with the Legal Tender Cases. 196 Hepburn v. Griswold197 was decided by the 5-3 vote of an eight-man Court. Justice

191 Jackson, "The Task of Maintaining Our Liberties; The Role of the Judiciary,"
g9 A.B.A.J. 961 at 962 (1953).
192 BLAUSTEIN AND FERGUSON, DESEGREGATION AND THE LAW 13-14 (1957).
193 319 U.S. 103 (1943).
194 316 U.S. 584 (1942).
195Youngstown Sheet&: Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579.(1952).
19612 Wall. (79 U.S.) 457 (1872).
197 8 Wall. (75 U.S.) 603 (1869).
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Grier, one of the five-man majority, resigned shortly thereafter.
And then President Grant named Justices Bradley and Strong
to create a nine-man Court. The result was the overruling in the
Legal Tender Cases by a 5--4 vote, with "no change in the opinions of those who concurred in the former judgment.''198 There
was no question of Grant's desire for an overruling; and there
was no doubt that the Court was increased in size to facilitate
such overrulings. But whether Bradley and Strong were appointed because of promises to overrule or because it was known
that they would vote to overrule is another matter. Evidence both
for and against this proposition is inconclusive.
VII
CONCLUSION

Here then are the basic data on the ninety overruling decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States. In these pagesand in the Appendix. which follows-are the statistics. Here, too,
is a discussion of the judicial discretion which leads to overrulings, and a presentation of some of the criteria which determine
when the exercise of that discretion was "necessary," "justified"
or possibly "unwarranted.''
Here also is a plea for more definite and expressed overrulings-and a plea for the proposition that it is "the duty of every
judge and every court to examine its own decisions, . . . without
fear, and to revise them without reluctance.'' 199 For there is
nothing wrong with a public confession of error. It is, of course,
far more important that the Supreme Court be right than that
it be consistent. It is far more important that the law be definite
than that discredited and outmoded doctrine be permitted to
survive.
"[W]e worry ourselves overmuch about the enduring consequences of our errors," wrote Cardozo. "They may work a little
confusion for a time. In the end, they will be modified or corrected or their teachings ignored. The future takes care of such
things." 200 But the future does not take care of such things unless the courts act. The problem is what the role of overrulings
should be in that future.
19812 Wall. (79 U.S.) 457 at 572 (1872).
199 Baker v. Lorillard, 4 N.Y. 257 at 261 (1850).
200 CARI>ozo, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 179 (1921).
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Collector v. Day
New York ex rel. Rogers v. Graves
Brush v. Commissioner

1842
1870
1937
1937

Greene v. Neal's Lessee

1832

overruling

16

Patton's Lessee v. Easton
Powell's Lessee v. Harmon

1816
1829

Halliburton Co. v. Walker
(Rehearing)

1946

overruling

E

11 mos.

Halliburton Co. v. Walker

1946

E

E

E

0

Helvering v. Hallock

1940

7-2

Frankfurter

Roberts, McReynolds

Helverlng v. St. Louis Union Trust
Co.
Becker v. St. Louis Union Trust Co.

1936

5-4

Sutherland

1935

5-4

Sutherland

Stone, Hughes, Brandeis,
Cardozo
Stone, Hughes, Brandeis,
Cardozo

Helvering v. Mountain Producers
Corp.

1938

5-2

Hughes

Butler, McReynolds

303 U.S. 876

6-3
5-4

Holmes
McReynolds

Pitney, Brandeis, Clarke
Brandeis, Roberts,
Cardozo, Stone

257 U.S. 501

6-3

Bradley

Clifford, Davis, Strong

18 Wall. (85 U.S.) 648

Swayne
Nelson
Bradley

--

2 Black (67 U.S.) 499
l Wall. (68 U.S.) 73
11 Wall, (78 U.S.) 610

overruling

overruling

6

16

Gillespie v. Oklahoma
Burnet v. Coronado 011 & Gas Co.

1922
1932

Hornbuckle v. Toombs

1873

overruling

Noonan v. Lee
Orchard v. Hughes
Dunphy v. Kleinsmith
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Oases
Hudson v. Guestler

overruling

Dates! Aue
1810
2

Rose v. Himely

1808

In re Disbarment of Isserman
(Rehearing)

1954

overruling
In re Disbarment of Isserman
Jones v. Opelika
Murdock v. Pennsylvania

6mos.

1880
1821

Kountze v. Oma.ha Hotel Co.

1882

Stafford v. Union Bank of Louisiana.

1858

overruling

overruling

29

6 Cranch (10 U.S.) 281

6-1

Marshall

Johnson, Wm.

4 Cranch (8 U.S.) 241

4-3

Per Curiam

Burton, Reed, Minton

348 U.S. 1

4-4

Vinson

Jackson, R. H., Black,
Frankfurter, Douglas

345 U.S. 286

Per Curiam
Douglas
Reed

7-0

M1ller

6-0

Johnson, Wm.

E

Stone, Murphy, Black,
Douglas

816 U.S. 584

-

6 Wheat. (19 U.S.) 204

Bradley

M1ller, Field

107 U.S. 378

Catron

16 How. (57 U.S.) 185

-

260 U.S. 653

9-0

Va.n Devanter

9-0

Fuller

Legal Tender Cases1

1872

5-4

Strong

E

103 U.S. 168

McLean

1906

3

819 U.S. 105

7-2

1923

overruling

319 U.S. 103

Jackson, R. H.

8-1

Lee v. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry, Co,

17

-Reed, Roberts, Frankfurter,

E

Ex parte Wisner

overruling

Citations

Marshall

5-4

59

Dissenters

Livingston

E

1942

Anderson v. Dunn

Opinion by

4-1

-5-4
llmos.

I

E

-

Chase, s. P., Clifford,
Field, Nelson

203 U.S. 449
12 Wall. (79 U.S.) 457

Hepburn v. Griswold

1869

5-3

Chase, S. P.

M1ller, Swayne, Davis

8 Wall. (75 U.S.) 608

Leloup v. Port of Mobile

1888

9-0

Bradley

-

127 U.S. 640

Osborne v. Mobile

1872

9-0

Chase, S. P.

-

16 Wall. (83 U.S.) 479

Leisy v. Hardin

1890

6-3

Fuller

Gray, Harlan, Brewer

135 U.S. 100

8-1

Taney

Daniel

5 How. (46 U.S.) 504

overruling
overruling

Peirce v. New Hampshire

16

43
1847

00
00

E

1943
1943

Kilbourn v. Thompson

Vote

E

1953

overruling

Jones v. Opelika.

Oategory•

E

El

1 In 1870, a Memorandum Opinion was handed down in the Lego( Tender Coses, n Woll, (78 U.S.) 682, reaching o conclusion directly opposite the decision reached in Hepburn v,
Griswold, It was not until 1872, however, that the Supreme Court rendered its opinion in the Legal Tender Coses, expressly overruling Hepburn v. Griswold.
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R, R. Co. v. Letson

8-0

1844

overruling

38

Wayne

B

Strawbridge v. Curtiss
Bank of the United States v.
Deveaux
Commercial & R. R. Bank v. Slocum

1806
1809

5-0
6-0

Marshall
Marshall

1840

9-0

Barbour

MacGregor v. Westinghouse Co.
(Rehearing)

1947

5-4

Black

4-4

overruling
MacGregor v. Westinghouse Co.
Madden v. Kentucky

11 mos.
1940

7-2
5

--

(.C)

2 How. (48 U.S.) 497

I-I

3 Crnnch (7 U.S.) 267
5 Cranch (9 U.S.) 61
14 Pet. (89 U,S,) 60

Frankfurter, Reed, Jackson,
Burton

329 U.S. 402

Per Curlam

(Not Recorded)

327 U.S. 758

Reed

Roberts, McReynolds

309 U.S. 83

E

u.s.

Colgate v. Harvey

1935

6-3

Sutherland

Stone, Brandeis, Cardozo

296

Mahnlch v. Southern S. S. Co.

1944

7-2

Stone

Roberts, Frankfurter

321 U.S. 96

overruling

16

E

Plamals v. The Plnar Del Rio

1928

9-0

McReynolds

Mason v. Eldred

1867

8-0

Field

overruling

57

E

-

404

277 U.S. 151
6 Wall. (73 U.S.) 231

Sheehy v. Mandeville

1810

5-0

Marshall

-

6 Cranch (10 U.S.) 253

Mercold Corporation v.
Mid-Continent Co.

1944

5-4

Douglas

Roberts, Reed, Frankfurter,
Jackson, R. H.

320 U.S. 661

overruling

34

D

Leeds & Catlin Co. v. Victor Talking
Machine Co. (2)

1909

9-0

McKenna

1885

8-0

Matthews

-

213 U.S. 325

Morgan v. United States

overruling

17

E

1868

5-3

Chase, S. P.

Grier, Swayne, Miller

7 Wall, (74 U.S.) 700

Motion Picture Patents Co. v.
Universal Film Mfg. Co.

1917

6-3

Clarke

Holmes, McKenna,
Van Devanter

243 U.S. 502

White, Hughes, Lamar

224 U.S. 1

Henry v. A. B. Dick Co.
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Toledo Newspaper Co. v. United
States

DateB

Age
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28

E

1941
1918

Vote

6-3

Douglas

Stone, Hughes, Roberts

813 U.S. 88

5-2

White

Holmes, Brandeis

247 U.S. 402

9-0

Rutledge

Oldahoma Tax Commission v. Texas
Co.
overruling
Choctaw, 0. & G. R. Co. v. Harrison
Indian Territory Illuminating Oil
Co. v. Oklahoma
Howard v. Gipsy Oil Co.
Large Oil Co. v. Howard
Oklahoma v. Barnsdall Refineries

1914

9-0

McReynolds

1916
1917
1919
1936

9-0
9-0
9-0
9-0

McKenna
Per Curlam
Per Curlam
Stone

Oklahoma Tax Commission v. United
States

1943

5-4

Black

overruling
Childers v. Beaver

1949
35

17

OUatiomi

Dissenters

Opini~n 'bV

E

E

--

836 U.S. 843
285 U.S. 292

--

240
247
248
296

U.S.
U.S.
U.S.
U.S.

522
503
549
521

Murphy, Stone, Reed,
Frankfurter

319 U.S. 598

-

270 U.S. 555

1926

9-0

McReynolds

Olsen v. Nebraska
overruUng
Rlbnilt v. McBride

1941

9-0

Douglas

-

313 U.S. 236

6-3

Sutherland

Stone, Holmes, Brandeis

277 U.S. 350

O'Malley v. Woodrough
overruUng
Evans v. Gore
Miles v. Graham

1939

7-1

Frankfurter

Butler

307 U.S. 277

7-2
8-1

Yan Devanter
McReynolds

Holmes, Brandeis
Brandeis

253 U.S. 245
268 U.S. 501

8-1

Douglas

Jackson, R. H.

336 U.S. 169

9-0
9-0
9-0

Swayne
Brewer
White

--

11 Wall. (78 U.S.) 428
198 U.S. 299
202 U.S. 409

6-3

Day

White, McKenna, McReynolds

245 U.S. 6

Ott v. Mississippi Bargellne
overruUng
St. Louis v. Ferry Co.
Old Dominion S. S. Co. v. Virginia
Ayer & Lord Tie Co. v. Kentucky
Penna. R. R. Co. v. Towers
overruling
Laite Shore Ry. Co. v. Smith
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E
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1949
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6-3

Peckham

Fuller, Gray, McKenna

173 U.S. 684

c.n

-.:r

Phelps Dodge Corp. v. N.L.R.B.

overruling

1941
34

D

8-0 1

Frankfurter

-

318 U,S, 177

6-2
6-3

Harlan (1st)
Pitney

McKenna, Holmes
Holmes, Day, Hughes

208 U.S. 161
236 U.S. 1

.Adair v. United States
Coppage v. Kansas

1908
1915

Philadelphia Steamship Co. v.
Pennsylvania

1887

8-0

Bradley

-

122 U.S. 826

State Tax On Ry. Gross Receipts

1872

6-3

Strong

Miller, Field, Hunt

15 Wall. (82 U.S.) 284

Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co.

1895

5-4

Fuller

Harlan, Brown, Jackson, H, E,
White

158 U.S. 601

3-0

Chase, S.

-

3 Dall, (3 U,S.) 171

6-2

Hughes

Butler, McReynolds

302 U.S. 388

4-4

Per Curiam

(Not Recorded)

301 U.S. 669

9-0

Miller

-

22 Wall. (89 U.S.) 444

9-0

Miller

overruling

14

overruling

99

Hylton v. United States

1796

Railroad Commission v. Pacific Gas
Co. (Rehearing)

1938

overruling

6mos.

Railroad Commission v. Pacific Gas
Co.

1937

Railway Co. v. McShane

1874

overruling

Railway Co. v. Prescott
Reid v. Covert (Rehearing)
Kinsella v. Krueger

overruling

2

B

0

E

1872
1957
1

Reid v. Covert
Kinsella v. Krueger

1956
1956

Roberts v. Lewis

1894

overruling

E

13

0

-

16 Wall, (83 U.S.) 603

6-2

Black

Clark, Burton

354 U.S.1

5-3
5-3

Clark
Clark

Warren, Black, Douglas
Warren, Black, Douglas

351 U.S. 487
351 U.S. 470

9-0

Gray

E

-

158 U.S. 867

Giles v. Little

1881

9-0

Woods

Rochester Tel. Corp. v. United States

1939

7-2 3

Frankfurter

Butler, McReynolds

307 U.S, 126

9-0

White

-

225 U.S. 282

7-2

Clarke

Van Devanter, McReynolds

245 U.S. 467

9-0

Taney

-

12 How. (63 U.S.) 861

overmHng

27

Proctor & Gamble v. United States

1912

Rosen v. United States

1918

overruling
United States v. Reid
1

66

0

E

1852

Unanimous on the point of overruling the prior decisions on the question.

• The actual decision was unanimous as to result, Justices Butler and McReynolds, however, dissented on the Issue of overruling the prior decision,
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Sherrer v. Sherrer

Dates

Andrews v. Andrews
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Smith v. Allwright

1944
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State Tax Commission v. Aldrich
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Vote
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Vinson

Frankfurter, Murphy

334 U.S. 848

5-3

White

Brewer, Shiras, Peckham
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Reed

Roberts

321 U.S. 649
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Roberts

-
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E

1935

First National Bank v. Maine

overruling
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1948

overruling

Grovey v. Townsend

Age

Cateoorv•

7-2

Douglas

Jackson, R. H., Roberts

316 U.S.174

6-3

Sutherland

Stone, Holmes, Brandeis

284 U.S. 312

8-0

Campbell

-

24 How. (65 U.S.) 427
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Williamson v. Berry
Williamson v. Irish Presbyterian
Congregation
Williamson v. Ball

1850

6-3

Wayne

Taney, Catron, Nelson

8 How. (49 U.S.) 496

1860
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6-3
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Wayne
Wayne

Taney, Catron, Nelson
Taney, Catron, Nelson

8 How. (49 U.S.) 566
8 How, (49 U.S.) 566

Terral v. Burke Construction Co.

1922

9-0

Taft

-

267 U.S. 629

Doyle v. Cont. Ins. Co.
Security Mutual Life Ins, Co. v.
Prewitt

1876

6-3

Hunt

Bradley, Swayne, Miller

94 U.S. 686

overruling

46

E

1906

7-2

Peckham

Day, Harlan (1st)

202 U.S. 246

Thibaut v. Car & General Ins.
Corp. (Rehearing)

1947

7-2

Per Curiam

Black, Burton

332 U.S. 828

Thibaut v. Car & General Ins. Corp.

1947

9-0

Per Curlam

-

832 U.S. 761

Tigner v. Texas

1940

8-1

Frankfurter

McReynolds

310 U.S. 141

Connolly v. Union Sewer Pipe Co.

1902

7-1

Harlan (1st)

McKenna

184 U.S. 540

Tilghman v. Proctor

1880

9-0

Bradley

-

102 U.S. 707

Mitchell v. Tilghman

1878

5-3

Clifford

Swayne, Strong, Bradley

19 Wall. (86 U.S.) 287

Toucey v. N. Y. Life Ins. Co.

1941

5-3

Frankfurter

Reed, Stone, Roberts

314

9-0

Day

-

256 U.S. 856

overruling

overruling

overruling
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Trebllcock v. Wllson
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Roosevelt v. Meyer

1863

United States v. Chicago, M., St. P.
&P. R, Co,

1941

overruling

8

overruling

88

United States v. Lynah
United States v. Heyward

1903
1919

United States v. Classic

1941

overruling
Newberry v. United States

20

7-2

Field

Bradley, M111er

12 Wall. (79 U.S.) 687

9-1

Wayne

Nelson

1 Wall. (68 U.S.) 612

9-0

Roberts

-

812 U.S. 692

5-3
4-4

Brewer
PerCurlam

White, Fuller, Harlan (1st)
(Not Recorded)

188 U.S. 445
250 U.S. 633

5-3

Stone

Douglas, Black, Murphy

313 U.S. 299

4-4'

McReynolds

White, Pitney, Brandeis,
Clarke

256 U.S. 232
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United States v. Darby

1941

9-0

Stone

-

312 U.S. 100

Hammer v. Dagenhart
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5-4

Day

Holmes, McKenna, Brandeis,
Clarke

~t%l

247 U.S. 251
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United States v. Nice

1916

9-0

Van Devanter

-

241 U.S. 591

overruling

overruling

23

11

E

E

Matter of Het.e

1905

8-1

Brewer

Harlan (1st)

197 U.S. 488

United States v. Phelps

1882

9-0

Waite

-

107 U.S. 320

overruling
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Shelton v. The Collector

1866

9-0

Swayne

-

5 Wall, (72 U.S.) 113

United States v. Rabinowitz

1950

5-3

Minton

Black, Frankfurter,
Jackson, R, H.

339 U.S. 56

overruling

2

El

Trupiano v. United States

1948

6-4

Murphy

Vinson, Black, Reed, Burton

334 U.S. 699

United States v. South-Eastern
Underwriters Assn.

1944

4-3

Black

Stone, Frankfurter,
Jackson, R. H.

322 U.S. 533

overruling
Paul v. Virginia

75
1869

Wabash, St, L. & P. Ry, Co. v. Illinois 1886

overruling

Pelk v, Chicago & N. Ry, Co.

D

1876

10

D

8-0

Field

-

8 Wall. (76 U.S.) 168

6-3

Mlller

Bradley, Gray, Waite

118 U.S. 557

7-2

Waite

Field, Strong

94 U.S. 164

'The actual decision was unanimous (9•0) as to result, Justice McKenna reserved Judgment on the constitutional question. The four dissenters dissented on the basis of the constitutional question only,
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Murphy, Jackson
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Brown, Harlan, Brewer,
Holmes

201 U.S. 562

E

1906

1946

tO

Opinion by

E

1923
1936

overruling
Zap v. United States

Vote
5-4

14

9verrultng
Haddock v. Haddock,

Age

Oategory•

7-0

Per Curiam .
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